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Abstract 
This paper presents a model for assessing the privacy „cost‟ of a surveillance system. 
Surveillance systems collect and provide personal information or observations of people 
by means of surveillance technologies such as databases, video or location tracking. Such 
systems can be designed for various purposes, even as a service for those being observed, 
but in any case they will to some degree invade their privacy. The model provided here 
can indicate how invasive any particular system may be – and be used to compare the 
invasiveness of different systems. Applying a functional approach, the model is 
established by first considering the social function of privacy in everyday life, which in 
turn lets us determine which different domains will be considered as private, and finally 
identify the different types of privacy invasion. This underlying model (function – 
domain – invasion) then serves to explain the ways in which a technology-based 
surveillance system can affect the privacy of the observed. The model thus identifies a set 
of general characteristics (dimensions) of surveillance system that will determine the 
degree of invasiveness. The applicability of the model is demonstrated by analyzing a 
location-based system for airport passengers developed for a Copenhagen Airport, and 
the dimensions are used to explain user reactions to different services offered by the 
system.  
 
This paper will present a model that identifies the main characteristics (dimensions) of a 
surveillance system that determine its degree of invasiveness.  The model may assist in 
identifying critical aspects of a surveillance system to reduce “privacy costs” and thus to 
overcome the concerns of those who are the object of surveillance. But the model can also 
identify aspects of invasion that users may not be aware of or have difficulty in articulating. In 
this role, the model may be useful for the analysis of ethical aspects of different surveillance 
systems and may aid in foreseeing problems and reactions that may not appear until some time 
after implementing a system has been implemented. 
The model is established by analyzing the notion of invasion of privacy, and invasion is in turn 
defined in terms of private domains. Finally, we suggest that private domains can be identified 
only by understanding what we use privacy for: the social function of privacy. We therefore 
consider these three steps in their logical order: the social function of privacy serving to identify 
the private domains and hence the various types of invasiveness. 
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What do we use privacy for? 
Privacy can be conceived of as a means of ensuring our security (protection from harm), as a 
precondition for building varied relationships and for establishing and maintaining individual 
autonomy. 
Security 
When privacy is discussed in terms of risk of abuse (Hong et al., 2004), it is regarded as a means 
of ensuring security or protection against harm (Moor, 1997). Such protection is necessary 
because others may use sensitive information about you for their own purposes, which may be 
contrary to your interests. Information about your bank account may be used to steal your 
money, data retrieved from your health records may affect your insurance premium, and the 
unwelcome attention of a stalker may even constitute a risk of a physical assault.  
In this perspective, protecting sensitive personal information and avoiding observation (e.g., 
stalking) is a means to reduce the risk of unwanted or even hostile actions by others. Concern for 
privacy is thus associated with emphasis on a hostile environment.  
Social relationships and roles 
But privacy concerns may not only prompt our seeking protection against abuse, but may also 
guide social relationships. We need privacy because in everyday life we have to conform to 
social norms of behavior. We have to maintain a public representation of ourselves, trying to 
control which parts of us are revealed to others in various contexts. We continually try to see 
ourselves in the eyes of others and to maintain an image or „face‟ of ourselves that match their 
expectations (Goffman 1959). 
While we thus conduct (much of) our social life as role-playing, we have a complementary need 
of a „space‟ where we are not „exposed‟. The sociologist Goffman distinguishes metaphorically 
between being onstage, where we constantly manage the impression we make on others 
(impression management), and being backstage where we can relax – in privacy – and prepare 
our onstage performance (Andersen et al., 2007; Goffman, 1959).  
Maintaining intimate relationships.  
One privacy area to which we may retire and relax from most of the social norms is when we  
engage in intimate relationships with particular individuals (Fried, 1968; Gerstein, 1978). In 
doing so, we need not spend mental resources on observing ourselves, continuously assessing 
how we may be judged by a greater audience. Intimate relationships require spontaneity, which 
is incompatible with maintaining a „face‟. Such privacy may be provided by private space – e.g. 
a private home – but also by private conversations in a public place without being disturbed or 
eavesdropped upon; and if deprived of such privacy, our potential for maintaining intimate 
relations will be inhibited. 
Varied relationships 
Privacy also enables the maintenance of varied – and not necessarily intimate – relationships  
(Rachels, 1975). We form varied relationships by choosing what secrets to share with whom. We 
show different sides of ourselves in different relationships, and we tend to share more with close 
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friends than with „looser‟ acquaintances. In order to maintain and form varied relationships we 
need to be able to distinguish between different contexts that imply different norms and 
expectations. We need to know how we are expected to behave, what the consequences are if we 
deviate from the norms, and how our behavior will be judged by others. But this varies 
depending on where we are and with whom. If we do not know who is watching us, we don‟t 
know how to behave and how our behavior may be judged. 
For instance, when two close friends are joined by a casual acquaintance (Rachels, 1975), their 
behavior and the content of their conversation are very likely to change. They will not share the 
same secrets with the third persons as they did with each other, and they have to take into 
account how the newcomer will interpret their behavior and conversation – perhaps taking 
precautions to avoid misunderstandings. 
Individual privacy and trust 
Besides the need for privacy to protect varied relationships from a larger public, there is also a 
need for individual privacy. While some might expect people to share everything within intimate 
relationships, Fried argues that these should be build on trust and that trust requires individual 
privacy (Fried, 1968). Trust is an expectation about other people‟s behavior and thus based on 
incomplete knowledge. If we have some people under constant observation, we know all about 
their behavior – we don‟t need to trust them, and there is no opportunity to build trust.  
The need for secrecy – and thus privacy – within intimate relationships can be illustrated by an 
example from a study of attitudes to location-enhanced technologies: a woman who does not 
want to be seen by her husband going into a particular shop because he thinks that she spends too 
much money there (Consolvo et al., 2005). Following Fried‟s argument, we may say that the 
husband‟s observing his wife would be an alternative to trusting her. 
Private domains 
Based on the understanding of the role of privacy sketched above, we will discuss a number of 
domains that are regarded as private – and thus potentially threatened by exposure. Still, it must 
be emphasized that privacy is not simply in opposition to maintaining social relations and 
identity and impression management, nor is  privacy merely a „refuge‟ where we protect 
ourselves from others by anonymity, secrecy and isolation (Gavison, 1980). Equally, any „release 
of information‟ etc. is not per definition a loss or cost. 
Rather, privacy should be understood as complementary to, and interwoven with, social identity. 
Privacy is implicit in impression management: it is what we don‟t share with everyone but 
choose to share selectively in order build social relations (Lahlou, 2008; Grimmelmann, 2008). 
This does not mean that we either keep others (strangers) out or let them in completely. We build 
social relations by trading „bits‟ of privacy – not by dissolving boundaries. 
Behavior, activities, decisions 
Our behavior is critical to building and maintaining social relationships and thus to managing 
impressions. We adapt to various social contexts in which behavior is regulated by social norms, 
and we are judged by our ability to comply with those norms. We are therefore concerned how 
people judge what we do, and we use our past activities – selectively – to build a social identity 
(Lahlou, 2008). 
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Impression management depends on our ability to legitimate our activities, or keep those 
activities private that do not match the norms. We may prefer privacy – either in isolation or 
protected by anonymity – to indulge in habits or pleasures that do not match comfortably with 
our self-presentation in some social circles. Yet the same habits may be an acceptable part of our 
identity in another context. Thus, privacy of behavior depends on our ability to be aware of who 
is watching our behavior. 
Private places 
The privacy of behavior explains the common spatial concept of privacy, because it requires a 
physical realm where we expect to be „let alone‟ (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). In our private 
home we can talk, behave and dress as we please, without being observed by others. Staying at 
home employs the strategy of solitude for maintaining privacy (Gavison, 1980).  
We can also obtain some degree of privacy in public places: for example, we can protect 
ourselves by anonymity (Gavison, 1980); and we expect norms of privacy to prevent others from 
observing us closely or eavesdrop on our conversations; hence, public places – e.g. restaurants or 
cinemas – are fundamentally associated with some degree of privacy (Krämer, 1995; Altman, 
1975). 
This private sphere may be subject to different types of invasion, either as physical intrusion or 
as different kinds of observation (see the section „Exposure – how can privacy be invaded?´, 
below).  
Finally, places can also be private in another sense. They can be closely associated with 
particular activities, and the very knowledge of our location – and movements – can reveal what 
we are doing (Lahlou, 2008), e.g. going to the cinema or a gym, or visiting a bar or a particular 
shop.  
Identity vs. anonymity 
As already suggested, we can protect our privacy in public by maintaining anonymity
 
(Gavison, 
1980) - we don‟t mind other people seeing „secret‟ sides of us in public, as a long as they don‟t 
know us and we do not expect to have anything to do with them later. Thus, we also guard our 
identity as a private area, and being identified may be an invasion in itself.  
Personal information 
The rise of the Internet have accentuated the virtual aspect of privacy, emphasizing that much 
information about us can be regarded as private, and that the acquisition of such information by 
others implies a loss of privacy. 
One aspect of the informational privacy covers various categories of personal information that 
may be regarded as sensitive or embarrassing and thus should be considered private – because 
they are critical either to our security or our social relations. This includes racial and ethnic 
background, political or religious conviction, sexual preferences (Gavison, 1980; DeCew, 1986), 
personal health (e.g., health records) (Fried, 1968), criminal records and financial data (Posner, 
1978).  
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However, informational privacy may also cover some of the other domains, especially 
information about our behavior or activities, e.g. “a person‟s remote and forgotten past” (Fried, 
1968).  
Personal relations and communication 
We build and maintain relations by sharing secrets selectively, and we have to assume that our 
personal communication is not overheard by others. Even Posner, a privacy skeptic, argues that 
communications should be guarded as private, because treating it as public (thus allowing 
eavesdropping) would inhibit all communication (Posner, 1978). And Gerstein argues that it is 
wrong to observe a person against his will, but that it is far worse “where the victim of the 
invasion was submerged in an intimate relationship” (Gerstein, 1978). 
Maintaining and establishing personal relations often occur in a public place, and when we 
engage in a private communication in public we normally estimate the degree of privacy: is 
anyone listening? Or are we protected by anonymity? Our estimation of privacy would be 
seriously jeopardized if we are in the vicinity of a camera or a listening device – and in particular 
if the observations or recordings could be related to our identity. 
Exposure – how can privacy be invaded? 
Based on the above discussion of various private domains we shall now summarize what can be 
considered as an invasion or a loss of privacy. We note in passing that we have deliberately 
wavered between the terms exposure, loss and invasion. We prefer the term exposure as the most 
neutral, while invasion both emphasizes the spatial metaphor and an active role played by 
another agent (an invader), whereas the term loss is passive and may have the connotation of a 
total loss – which is not intended here, of course. 
We distinguish among three types of invasion (or loss or exposure): intrusion, observation 
(intrusive vs. spying) and acquisition of personal information by others. 
1. The most obvious form of invasion is the physical intrusion of a private space such as the 
private home or other spatial demarcations, e.g. a workplace office or even a spot in a 
public park.  
2. Observation is also form of invasion. If we are aware of being observed, we may speak 
of intrusive observation because we may change our behavior when we become aware of 
the observer‟s perspective and intentions. But concealed observation – spying – is also an 
invasion, since we are being observed, and „judged‟ by someone „out there‟, and an 
image or profile of us would be built (in someone‟s mind) that may affect our 
opportunities in the future. Gavison argues that the attention is a loss of privacy – the fact 
we have been „singled out‟ and identified. Similarly,  Introna argues that the judgment 
and scrutiny by others is an invasion (Introna, 1997). It should be emphasized that 
observation is not simply invasive in terms of acquiring information (see below). E.g., 
somebody spying on us in our homes through a telescope, may be regarded as invading 
our privacy – even if they fail to acquire new information (Gavison, 1980). 
3. A third form of invasion, and one that is in focus when discussing privacy on the Internet, 
occurs when others acquire personal information about us. Such information could be 
abused, perhaps threatening our security, or it could affect our social relations.  
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Social function of privacy  
- Security 
- Social relationships and roles  
Private domains Behaviors (activities, decisions) 
- Private places 
- Identity 
- Personal information 
- Personal relations and communications 
Invasions of privacy  
- Intrusion 
- Observation 
- Acquisition of information 
Dimensions of surveillance technologies  
- Observer 
- Identification 
- Place 
- Sensitivity of content 
- Granularity 
- Purpose 
- Awareness and control 
Figure 1. Overview of the model presenting the underlying 
concepts of social function, private domains and types of invasions 
as a basis for determining seven dimensions of surveillance 
technologies. 
Invasive technologies – seven dimensions 
Loss of privacy is often associated with technological development that offers new or improved 
opportunities for providing and collecting information and observations. Yet, the degree of 
invasion is not determined by the technology itself, but depends on its application in a system 
that provides surveillance for someone (the observer) for some purpose.  
And the threat is not limited to the paradigmatic surveillance where someone is watched by 
somebody else. Rather, invasions may often be unexpected consequences of technology-based 
services designed to support communication and social relations. For instance, mobile phones 
may provide the caller with information about the receiver‟s current situation to reduce 
interruptions (Khalil & Connelly, 2006); verbal communication may be augmented by video that 
reveals more than intended (Short et al., 1976); and friends may share personal information – 
including location – via Online Social Networks such as Facebook, without being quite aware of 
the extent of the audience (Grimmelmann, 2008; Lahlou, 2008) – to name but a few prominent 
examples. 
Rather than focusing on the privacy aspects of one particular technology or application, this 
paper proposes a general model that allows us to compare the privacy implications of different 
„surveillance systems‟. Technologically different systems may have many critical characteristics 
in common – e.g. the observer and purpose of the surveillance. Therefore, invasions associated 
with a particular technology – e.g. video and RFID – are better understood in terms of basic 
private domains such as those presented in the previous section. 
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The model we propose include a number of dimensions that affect the degree of invasion and 
that correspond to some of the factors identified in a number of studies of users‟ willingness to 
disclose information (Adams, 2000; Lederer et al., 2003; Consolvo et al., 2005; Khalil & 
Connelly, 2006). These studies emphasize the receiver identity or the „who‟ (the observer) and 
the „usage‟ or „why‟ (purpose). Level of detail (granularity) and location (Consolvo et al., 2005) 
are also relatively well defined, while other factors such as context (Adams, 2000) and situation 
(Lederer et al., 2003) are more difficult to specify, but might be indicated by the type of place. 
One study also considers whether the participants „have company‟, and whether they are engaged 
in „conversation‟ (Khalil & Connelly, 2006), which is highly relevant according to our definition 
of the role of privacy, but not useful as characteristics of the surveillance system itself. 
1. The observer – who wants the information? 
Bearing in mind the role of privacy the degree of invasion obviously depends largely on who the 
observer is. One can distinguish between different types of observers: institutions (both public 
authorities and private companies) and people who are somehow socially related to the object of 
surveillance. 
Institutional surveillance will primarily affect the security aspect, whereas relational 
surveillance will affect the observed subject‟s potential for presentation management. The 
character of invasion associated with state surveillance (Big Brother) differs from surveillance 
by private companies (Little brother), but this difference largely depends on other factors such as 
the purpose of the observation, and the degree of identification (negation of anonymity). 
As for relational surveillance, the loss of privacy will generally decrease, the closer the 
relationship with the observer, because we already share more with those we know best, e.g., 
more with a significant other or family member than with a boss or a stranger (Khalil & 
Connelly, 2006). Yet we can still lose privacy to a significant other, as discussed previously (see 
the section „Individual privacy and trust‟).  
2. Degree of personal identification 
The loss of privacy also depends strongly on the degree to which a person is identified, since 
identification disables one of our basic strategies for privacy protection: anonymity (Gavison, 
1980). So, a tracking system is more invasive than camera surveillance in a public place to the 
extent that the former and not the latter has information about people‟s identity. 
Identification may be derived from other types of information, e.g. databases with narrow group 
identifiers or RFID-applications attached to items that are closely associated with a particular 
individual. 
3. Setting – type of place 
The loss of privacy also depends on where the surveillance takes place, since we fundamentally 
perceive places in terms of the degree of privacy they afford (cf. above).). Surveillance will be 
more invasive in a private home than in a public square, since there will be privacy „to lose‟. But 
there are many categories in-between the two extremes (Grandhi et al., 2005). 
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4. Sensitivity of content: information and observations 
Obviously, the degree of invasion also depends on the information and observations collected by 
the surveillance system. On the one hand, much „literal‟ information can be classified in degrees 
of sensitivity (see section on „Personal information‟). On the other hand, particular surveillance 
technologies may also invade other private domains in a more complex sense than simply 
acquiring information. 
Thus a camera can observe behaviour (activities cf. above) and personal relationships, and 
provide nonverbal cues – e.g. facial expression, body language – that may reveal feelings and 
reactions that were not intended for a wider audience.  
Listening devices are designed to record conversation – which is in itself a highly private domain 
(cf above) – and may thus disclose any type of sensitive information. 
Location-based systems can indicate activities associated with certain locations, and movements 
between different places may also suggest something about personality and intentions. 
Furthermore, co-locations with other people indicate social relations. 
5. Surveillance technologies - granularity 
Focusing on the particular surveillance technologies, the degree of invasion increases with the 
technology‟s degree of accuracy: a low resolution camera would not register facial expression, 
and a superficial tracking system (low precision, infrequent registration) can only give a very 
vague location and „blurred‟ movements.  
6. The ‘purpose’ of observation 
The loss of privacy also depends on the purpose of a surveillance system, which is often related 
to the subject (the observer). E.g. institutional surveillance by the state is often established for 
security or control, surveillance by private companies normally carried out for commercial 
purposes, while relational surveillance is established for the purpose of social awareness: 
sharing information with friends, contacts and relatives, seeing each other on video or keeping 
track of each other‟s whereabouts.  
The purpose affects the degree of privacy invasion, because it determines the way the 
information is being interpreted – and judged (Introna, 1997). Certain activities or words may be 
critical and provoke scrutiny and interpretation, and those being observed, if aware of the 
surveillance, will modify their behaviour to avoid being “caught” or exposed It must be 
emphasized that the focus here is on how the purpose affects the loss of privacy, which must be 
separated from the effect on the users‟ accept of surveillance. The perceived benefits of  a 
particular surveillance system may lead users to accept it even at a considerable loss of privacy, 
based on a cost-benefit trade-off (Ng-Kruelle et al., 2002). But it is important to treat the 
questions separately, since the users‟ loss of privacy remains and is not reduced by their accept.  
7. Awareness and control 
Whether the observed subject is aware of the observer is crucial to the degree of invasion, 
because our impression management – in terms of controlling behaviour and disclosure of 
information – is directed towards the perceived audience. We maintain social relations by 
sharing information selectively. 
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Thus, some online social networks are invasive, since users cannot control the audience, or the 
actual audience turns out to be larger than expected. If a surveillance system does not provide 
adequate cues indicating the actual audience (Grimmelmann, 2008; Tsai et al., 2009; Hansen et 
al., 2009), people may be led to unintended disclosure – as when pictures shared with friends are 
viewed by a potential employer. 
Besides awareness of the audience, loss of privacy also depends on the users‟ control over the 
disclosure – the ability to be selective. However, the control dimension should primarily be 
applied to identify problems – increased invasiveness due to lack of control – rather than treated 
as a recommendation of sophisticated control features, since these often do do not match the 
more subtle social mechanisms they were meant to support.  
Observer Institutional (public, private) 
Relational (closeness/degree of intimacy) 
Identification Individual, group, anonymous 
Place Private vs. public (degrees) 
Sensitivity of content 
(data, activities) 
Personal data (categories) 
Sensitive behaviors 
Granularity Level of detail, temporal extension 
Purpose Safety, security, commercial,  relational 
Awareness, control overt vs. hidden surveillance;  
degree of control 
Table 1. Dimensions of surveillance systems affecting their degree of invasiveness 
Tracking airport passengers – an example 
The applicability of the model can be demonstrated by using the dimensions outlined above to 
analyze privacy implications of a location-based service (the Gatecaller) being developed for 
passengers in Copenhagen Airport (Hansen et al., 2009). The service, which is based on RFID 
and Bluetooth,  was designed, first, to reduce flight delays due to passengers not arriving in time 
for boarding, in which case their luggage must be unloaded with ensuing delayed departure, and 
second, to reduce passenger anxiety and uncertainty about being late. Furthermore, the airport 
expected commercial benefits when passengers spend more time in the shopping area and less 
time waiting in front of information screens to catch their gate and boarding time and, similarly, 
less „buffer time‟ waiting at the gate. The application offers three different services: a basic 
service and two additional features that are specified as optional based on the expectation that 
these services have increasing implications for privacy (see discussion below). 
Two surveys have been carried to elicit travelers‟ attitudes to the Gatecaller services and 
associated privacy issues. The first is a web-based survey, and the other is a questionnaire survey 
of passenger reactions to the first trials with the prototype system. The web survey, from which 
most of the following is derived, invited respondents to make a cost-benefit trade-off (Ng-
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“Do you think you might like to use Gatecaller 
or are you, perhaps, a bit skeptical of a 
technology that can track your location within 
an airport? In either case, we'd like your 
opinion on this new service and on tracking 
technologies in general.” 
 
Kruelle et al., 2002), balancing the perceived privacy cost of the service against the expected 
gains. While this paper focuses on the „cost side‟ of this trade-off, both the web survey and the 
field trial confirmed that there was indeed a perceived benefit.  
A test trial was carried in cooperation with an airline (Scandinavian Airlines System) inviting 
passengers on two charter flights to in a pilot trial by carrying an RFID badge on their handbag 
between check-in and till they reached their gate and to register their mobile phone. Arriving at 
the gate, the volunteers were asked to fill out a short questionnaire on their experience. One of 
the questions was: “Has it made you feel more secure that the gate personnel now may find you 
if you are late”, and as can be seen from the answers (Table 2), a majority (60 %) feels to some 
degree or to a large degree more secure. 
[N = 76] No, not at all No, hardly at all Yes, to some degree Yes, to a large degree 
20 % 20 % 39 % 21 % 
Table 2.  "Feeling more secure now?" 
Web survey indicating varying degrees of invasion 
A web survey was carried out prior to field trials to assess potential users‟ attitude to the service 
and especially their perceptions of privacy „costs‟. Announcements of and invitation to the 
survey was posted on a popular travel website. Since the validity of web surveys is often 
undermined by the fact that samples are based on self selection, various measures were taken to 
appeal to different groups of respondents. The questions and lead-up texts were deliberately 
phrased to attract in equal measure respondents who are keen to use new IT-technology as well 
as those who are concerned about privacy issues – and thus to reduce the risk that the sample 
would be biased towards either the „tech savvy‟ or the „privacy paranoids‟ (see Figure 2). 
Furthermore, the invitation was also designed to attract the „lukewarm‟ by giving respondents the 
opportunity to participate in a draw for a modest 
reward (10 gift cards, each at $58). 
After a fairly detailed description of the service 
respondents are asked whether they would use the 
proposed service. Those who answer „no‟, are 
asked to indicate their reasons for declining the 
service. The questions thus invites the respondents 
to make an informed choice and thus to consider 
whether they are so concerned that they would 
decline the service. They are asked not merely about their attitude, but invited – indirectly – to 
rate the privacy cost against potential benefits. As can be seen in the following, only a small 
proportion of respondents are concerned about the basic Gatecaller service, but results indicate 
increasing concerns over the two additional services, and the model presented above can be used 
to explain some of these differences. 
1) Automatic, location-based services 
The respondents were very positive towards the basic service (the GateCaller) which provides 
mobile information to the passenger‟s cell phone about gate number and boarding time, as well 
as an estimation of the time required to reach the gate. A majority of respondents (83 %; N = 
Figure 2. Invitation text for web survey. 
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503) said „yes‟ and 13 % „maybe‟ to using this service which is based on an automatic 
registration of the passenger‟s current location and flight information. Only 4 % said „no‟.  
2) Locating delayed passengers – some reluctance 
A majority (67 %) also wanted an additional service allowing gate personnel to locate and 
possibly call them, should they be in danger of missing their flight. However, one out of four (26 
%) preferred to stick with the basic version, thus rejecting this additional service. Asked for their 
reasons for doing so, most of them (72 %) indicated that they don‟t need it, while 22 % don‟t 
want others to see their location, and 15 % express concern about data misuse (n = 125; reply 
options non-exclusive). 
This reluctance to accept the „locator‟ service, partly based on privacy concerns, indicates that it 
is considered more invasive than the basic service, and this difference may be explained by 
referring to some of the dimensions presented in this paper. 
It is more invasive along the identity dimension. Already, the basic service undermines the 
passengers‟ anonymity which is a basic privacy protection in a public place like the airport. But 
the basic service only requires group identification as members of a passenger list, while the 
„locator‟ service requires individual identification. 
It is also more invasive in the observer dimension, since it adds a human observer to the 
automatic, impersonal observer in the basic version. In terms of social relations, the passenger‟s 
location and movements will now be watched by a stranger who, moreover, will possibly meet 
her at the gate. 
The sensitivity of content is also increased by the human observer who may interpret location and 
movements as information about the passenger‟s activities (depending on the granularity 
provided). Location data will now be associated with meaning. Is the passenger shopping (in 
which shop) or resting at a café or in a waiting area? Rather than speculating on what „snoopy‟ 
observers might interpret from passenger locations – a subject ripe with anecdotes and over-
interpretations – we may focus on the meaning that the gate personnel associate with locations 
and movements when guided by their professional purpose. Their task is to board the passengers 
in time for departure, and they will monitor them (their dots on the screen) in this perspective: 
are they on their way to the gate or „straying‟ in a shopping area in the opposite direction? 
Passengers staying at a bar may receive extra attention, since they are rumored to cause delay – 
and this professionally motivated attention may also imply judgments concerning drinking 
habits. 
Table 3. Compares 'basic' with 'locator' service along four privacy dimensions. 
Dimension Basic Gatecaller ‘Locator’ 
Identification Passenger list Individual 
Observer Automatic system Gate personnel (stranger) 
Sensitivity of information neutral location data Places indicating activities 
Purpose Not applicable (no 
human observer 
„Are they responsible?‟ 
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3) Family monitoring – more skepticism 
The respondents were more skeptical towards another additional service, letting the passenger 
revealing his or her location to friends or relatives via real-time upload of location data to a 
server. This could be used by parents to traveling teenagers or relatives to traveling elderly or 
disabled passengers who might feel insecure when alone in the airport.  
Well over a third (39 %) of the respondents would use this „family monitoring‟ service – seeing 
or being seen by a relative or friend – while an equal proportion (39 %) rejected it, most of them 
(70 %) indicating that „people should be left to walk around‟ (i.e. a privacy concern), while 40 % 
stated that they don‟t need the service. 
This result suggests that the „family monitoring‟ service is considered even more invasive than 
the „locator‟ service. This may also be – partly – explained by the model since the two services 
differ along at least two dimensions: granularity and observer. Thus the „family monitoring‟ 
service is more invasive in the technical dimension, since it is continuous and extends through 
the entire stay at the airport, whereas the basic service only focuses on the location around the 
time of boarding.  
However, it also differs significantly along the observer dimension, since the „stranger‟ is now 
replaced by a relative or friend, thus converting the institutional surveillance to a social 
„awareness‟ service – comparable to a Social Network System like Facebook. This difference is 
more ambiguous, since one might expect the closer social relationship to be less invasive – and 
thus balance the effect of increased granularity. Nevertheless, this „intimate observer‟ also 
invades individual privacy, and locations may be more ripe with meaning, since relatives and 
friends may be attentive to more – and other – details than the gate personnel. 
Conclusion 
The privacy model presented here has been developed to help in assessing the privacy 
implications of a surveillance system and in comparing different systems. It can inform the 
design of empirical studies of user attitudes and levels of acceptance, for instance, by suggesting 
framing of questions that direct attention to aspects of use and types of privacy loss that may not 
be immediately distinct. The main benefit of the model is therefore its ability to support analysis 
of technology-based services by considering the basic roles of privacy, and the consequences for 
the private domains. 
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